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Notes
TAKINGS 1992: SCALIA'S JURISPRUDENCE
AND A FIFfH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE TO
AVOID LOCHNER REDIVIVUS'
[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
(or property) theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation
of the citizen to the State or of laissezfaire. It is made for people of
fundamentally different views, and the accident of our finding certain
opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not
to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States....
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people
and our law.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Holmes's hoary admonition, made nearly a century ago, has since
stood as a warning to the federal judiciary about the impropriety of usurping the
constitutional role of Congress and state legislatures by deciding cases based
upon judges' ideological predilections. After a prolonged flirtation with laissez
faire,3 Holmes's position4 eventually carried the day, as the Court veered away
1. Lochner Redivvus, or Lochner Revisited, is a phrase borrowed from Professor Frank I.
Michelman's contribution to the 1988 Columbia Law Review Symposium on Takings. See Frank
I. Michelman, Takings 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1609 (1988).
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1902) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3. In Lochner and a series of successive cases, the Court struck down legislation targeted at
protecting unskilled laborers from long hours, low wages, and unsafe conditions. See Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating federal anti-union discrimination regulation);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating state anti-union discrimination regulation);
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating District of Columbia minimum wage
regulation); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (invalidating state
minimum wage regulation) The Court, operating in part under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, invalidated regulations on the theory that business and labor should
be free to contract without these regulations, even to the detriment of labor. The Court construed
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from legislating from the bench5 and began applying a more deferential standard
to regulatory legislation.6
Ironically, another opinion authored by Justice Holmes has allowed the
current Supreme Court to stray back into the murky, discredited waters of the
the word liberty in the Due Process Clauses to implicate such a liberty of contract. Although
Lochner itself was overruled in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), Lochner's influence
continued. The Court's conservative activism lasted until the 1930s, clearing the path for business
development, unfettered by the interference of legislators. To distinguish the Lochner period's use
of due process from the use of due process advocated in this note, the Lochner approach will be
referred to as economic due process. See John A. Humbach, Economic Due Process and the
Takings Clause, 4 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 311 (1987).
4. The position that the Court should not second-guess legislatures also implicates the intent of
the constitutional framers. Although the Federalists were concerned with creating an independent
federal judiciary, the separation of powers doctrine also embedded in the Constitution, see infra note
186, meant that the Court was not intended to be a branch of government that would actively
influence national policy in the same manner as the political branches of government. THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (W. Kendall & G. Carey eds., 1966). Because
the federal judiciary would have neither the power of the purse, nor the power of the sword, id.,
the Court was intended to be a check on coequal branches, as well as state governments, to ensure
that government operated within constitutional parameters. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos.
78-80 (Alexander Hamilton). See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (judicial
review of Congress); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) Oudicial review
of state legislatures); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (judicial review of state
criminal proceedings).
5. Generally, the collapse of economic due process is attributed to Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934), and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Some commentators have
credited this sudden shift away from economic due process to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's
court-packing scheme, whereby older members of the Court would have been supplemented with
younger justices, presumably more sympathetic to FDR's New Deal legislation. See generally
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941); William E. Leuchtenburg,
The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's 'Coun Packing" Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 347.
6. The deference applied by the Court to legislation under a due process analysis after West
Coast Hotel illustrates the reasonableness, or minimum rationality, standard. This standard took the
teeth out of economic due process analysis and lowered the due process scrutiny given to economic
regulation by the Court to the level at which it currently stands. Under the Due Process Clause,
legislation is constitutional if 'there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought
that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 465 (1981) (stating that the constitutional standard is whether the legislature 'could have
rationally decided" that the regulation would serve the stated public interest). Justice Brennan,
dissenting in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), cites with favor the
"classic statement of the rule": "It must appear, first, that the interests of the public... require
[government] interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose.. . ." Id. at 843 n.1 (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894)
(pre-Lochner)).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 [1994], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss2/9
1994] TAKINGS 1992 745
Lochner period's higher scrutiny. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,7 with
Holmes writing for the Court, introduced the regulatory takings doctrine.8 In
Pennsylvania Coal, the Court stated that while the government can generally
regulate the use of private property, the government can also, in certain cases,
push this regulation "too far," at which time the regulation "will be recognized
as a taking. "I The Court in recent years has resurrected Pennsylvania Coal and
the regulatory takings doctrine it spawned."0 More importantly, the holdings
7. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court considered the constitutionality of
the Kohler Act, a Pennsylvania land-use regulation that required coal companies to refrain from
mining below habitable structures. The landowner had sought an injunction in state court to prevent
such mining beneath his home, despite the fact that the coal company held legal title to his right of
subterranean support.
8. The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall . .. be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment states that "no State shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Takings Clause to apply in two different contexts:
first, physical-invasion takings-government regulation that actually appropriates private property
for public use, see, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982),
and second, regulatory takings-government regulation that deprives a private property owner of
some aspect of ownership without physically invading the property, see, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. at
825. See infra notes 53-66 for a discussion of Loretto and infra notes 84-104 for a discussion of
Nollan.
Though the issue of what use government may make of condemned property is beyond the
scope of this note, the Court had held that as long as the purpose is debatably in the public's
interest, the public use requirement of the takings clause is satisfied. See Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954) (Fifth Amendment); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)
(Fourteenth Amendment).
9. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. As generally understood, this passage implicates the
government's duty to pay the landowner just compensation for the land taken, under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment if the federal government is the regulator, or under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause if a state government is the regulator. See Chicago Burlington
& Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 10.2, at 335 (4th ed. 1991):
The fifth amendment guarantee of just compensation technically has not been
incorporated in the fourteenth amendment. Nevertheless, the Court has held that the
fourteenth amendment due process guarantee provides the same safeguard against a
state's taking of property without just compensation.
Whether this explicit use of due process renders the regulatory takings doctrine, as applied to the
states, nugatory is debatable. Clearly, if the Court is using the Due Process Clause to analyze
regulatory takings challenges to state legislation, the proper standard of review for state legislation
should be rational scrutiny, see supra note 6, not Justice Scalia's nexus test, see infra notes 84-117.
10. After a considerable break from application of the takings doctrine to the merits of a case,
the Court in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), brought the Takings
Clause back into vogue. Since then, both the Burger Court and the Rehnquist Court have used the
Takings Clause more frequently. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419; Agins v. City of Tiberon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980); and Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) for takings cases in the
Burger Court, and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); First
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in the proliferation of new takings decisions forebode a return to the stricter
scrutiny of regulatory legislation under the police power," not applied since the
Lochner period ended in 1937.12
The Court's return to the stricter scrutiny of Lochner in takings
jurisprudence is especially apparent in the regulatory takings opinions written by
Justice Antonin Scalia. 3 Most recently in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, Justice Scalia led a six justice majority in invalidating a state
environmental protection and public safety law. The Lucas decision, when read
in the context of Justice Scalia's other takings opinions, demonstrates first, that
the current Court will scrutinize more closely than previous Courts the
legislative motives behind police power legislation that adversely affects private
property interests.' 4 Second, as argued in this Note, Lucas demonstrates that
this Court will apply stricter scrutiny to advance its ideological predilections in
favor of real estate development rights."'
The parallel to the Lochner period is startling. Just as Lochner and its
progeny exalted common law contract rights, 6 untouchable by legislatures, so
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); and Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) for takings cases in the Rehnquist Court.
11. "Police power" connotes the term generally applied to regulations enacted to promote the
health, safety, and welfare of the polity. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 395 (1926). Professor William B. Stoebuck has characterized legislation enacted under the
police power as designed to "advance the public interest to some degree." William B. Stoebuck,
Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980). See also Joseph
L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 36 n.6 (1964) (giving a definition and
examples of the police power). An example of a police power enactment would be the Kohler Act
in Pennsylvania Coal. Other examples would include zoning ordinances and rent control ordinances.
See, e.g., Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. at 365 (zoning); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988)
(rent control).
12. See supra note 5.
13. Alfred P. Levitt, Comment, Taking on a New Approach: The Rehnquist-Scalia Approach
to Regulatory Takings, 66 TEMP. L.Q. 197 (1993) (arguing that Scalia has spearheaded an analytical
revolution in takings jurisprudence). Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825
(see infra notes 84-104) and a dissenting opinion in Pennell, 485 U.S. at 1 (see infra notes 105-17).
In 1992 he authored the majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992). This note will focus upon Justice Scalia's approach because he has recently been the
Court's most vocal member in the takings arena.
14. Robert H. Freilich & Elizabeth A. Garvin, Takings afier Lucas: Growth Management,
Planning, and Regulation Implementation Will Work Better than Before, 22 STETSON L. REv. 409,
433 (1993) (noting that the tone of the Lucas opinion demonstrates an air of open hostility toward
government regulation).
15. See infra notes 118-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lucas.
16. In most of the economic due process decisions, the Court flavored its analysis with
references to natural law in general, and specifically to the proposition that the Constitution did not
limit the rights of the polity to freely contract either to its benefit or detriment. See supra note 3
and cases cited therein.
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Justice Scalia and the current Court have placed land development rights on a
similar pedestal by insisting that stricter scrutiny apply to land use
regulations.17  The problem inherent in emphasizing developmental rights is
that the Court may invalidate valuable legislative initiatives that do not afford
landowners the most profitable use of their property, 8 although other valuable,
non-economic uses for the property may exist.' 9 The current Court has taken
cognizable steps toward a course of decisions under the Takings Clause that
mirrors the Lochner bias for economic development.'
In resurrecting Lochnerian jurisprudence, the Court has haphazardly
stepped around precedent and added unclarity to the already convoluted body of
takings jurisprudence.2' Justice Scalia's formulation of the test for regulatory
takings requires a close nexus: the government must target its regulation at the
land that causes the problem which the government attempts to solve." Such
narrow tailoring may be proper where personal liberties are at stake to protect
the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights," but regulation that merely
17. This trend toward stricter scrutiny began in Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825 and continued in
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2886. See infra notes 84-104 for a discussion of Nollan and notes 118-65 for
a discussion of Lucas.
18. The current Court has taken Justice Holmes's "too far' rule too far by holding that if a
landowner is being blocked by regulation from making the most profitable use of property, then any
other use of the property, obviously less profitable, will not be considered valuable at all. See infra
notes 131-35 and accompanying text. This naturally leads to the determination that if the diminution
in value between the property without the regulation and the property encumbered by the regulation
is total, that the regulation has indeed gone "too far."
19. See infra notes 131-35 for a discussion of alternatives to economic value in the context of
the Lucas decision.
20. This Lochnerian shift under the Takings Clause suffers from the same shortcomings as
economic due process. Though advocacy for individual rights from the bench may appear noble,
strong arguments exist against the advocacy of economic rights. Judicial legislation violates the
separation of powers doctrine, and may even impede the proliferation of legislative initiatives to
serve long-term interests of the polity. See infra notes 240-42.
21. Legal scholars characterize the Court's approach to takings as a muddled mess. See, e.g.,
Stoebuck, supra note 12, at 1059 n.1 1 (takings law is "as disheveled as a ragpicker's coat"); Frank
I. Michelman, Propeny, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Fbundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (stating that attempts to formulate static,
predictable rules have yielded only ethically unsatisfying rules for takings cases). Even the Court
itself has recognized that no "set formula" has been developed to determine when a taking occurs
and that whether a taking will be found depends "upon the particular circumstances" of each case,
as the Court engages in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." Penn Cent. Tramp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
22. See infra notes 84-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development of
Scalia's nexus requirement.
23. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See also
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 9, at 377-78 ("In sharp contrast to the Court's almost total
abandonment of any real scrutiny of economic legislation under substantive due process... analysis
is its increasingly strict examination of legislation and government actions that affect civil rights or
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targets property use should receive a more deferential review.' Property
rights should be subject to more legislative direction without stricter scrutiny in
order to afford the legislature sufficient "elbow room"' to enact new
regulations to fit new problems.'
With the Court's takings doctrine in flux, the proposal of a new approach
to takings may help to prevent a recurrence of Lochner's excesses. The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment has never been a proper gauge for analyzing the
constitutionality of police power exercises. The Takings Clause only properly
prescribes the consequences of a non-compensated exercise of the eminent
domain power.7 A deferential due process analysis would more properly
liberties.").
24. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 144 (creating a distinction between personal and
property rights). See also Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw.
U. L. REv. 628, 659-60 (1988) (documenting the development of the personal/property right
distinction). CQ Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (personal right) (holding that content-
based restriction on speech will trigger heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 256 (1977) (same) (holding that suspect
racial classification in ordinance will trigger heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause). According to Justice Brennan, the threshold question of rationality in
police power cases is "reasonableness." The regulation may then trigger heightened scrutiny if it
is "unduly oppressiveupon individuals." See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
843 n.l (1987) (Brennan, ., dissenting); see also supra note 6 and authorities cited therein.
25. This concept of legislative "elbow room" is analogous to that afforded to publishers after
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964), to avoid chilling protected speech. Legislatures
may be chilled in enacting ground-breaking regulations if legislators know that landowners have a
right to compensation even if a temporary taking is found. See First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 340-41 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cautious
local officials may never take necessary regulatory action if temporary takings require
compensation); infra note 241. This chilling effect is more pronounced under a strict scrutiny
regime under which a taking is more likely to be found.
26. A particularly good example of new problems to be addressed by legislatures is
environmental protection. Legislatures have limited experience in this area, and as such, are not yet
adept at tailoring means to ends. Therefore, environmental protection legislation is not likely to pass
strict scrutiny, despite the desperate need for such measures. See Luc-as v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (regulation protecting coastal zone invalidated).
The fact that environmental legislation does not fall under a traditional category of police
power regulations, which would likely receive more deference from the Court, like nuisance
abatement or zoning, presents an additional barrier to such legislation under the current Court's
regulatory takings analysis. Rather than stunting the growth of potentially valuable legislation, the
Court should encouragegovernment's efforts by applying lower scrutiny to all exercises of the police
power, both traditional and non-traditional. See also NoUan, 483 U.S. at 846 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Legislatures .... who deal with the situation from a practical standpoint, are better
qualified than the courts to determine the necessity, character, and degree of regulation which these
new and perplexing conditions require . . . .") (quoting Goreib v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927)
(upholding ban on developing certain portions of real estate tract)).
27. See infra note 239 and accompanying text for a new proposed rule for regulatory takings.
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judge regulation of property use.' Using the Due Process Clause to analyze
land use regulation does not imply that the Takings Clause would be read out
of the Constitution?9 On the contrary, the Takings Clause should be afforded
its original place in the American constitutional scheme' as a guarantee to
private property owners that the government will pay for physical invasions of
private property either by the government or by government-authorized
trespassers. 3
The propriety of this proposed rule, which distinguishes between a Takings
Clause analysis for physical invasions by the government and a Due Process
Clause analysis for mere police power regulations, becomes apparent after
reading the pair of 1992 takings cases: Yee v. City of Escondido2 and Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council.33 The Takings Clause should be invoked
only in cases of physical invasion, while the Due Process Clause should gauge
the constitutionality of police power regulations affecting property.34
28. Emphasis should be placed on the word 'deferential." Deference to legislative judgment
distinguishes the pre- and post-Lochner constructions of the Due Process Clause. The new takings
rule proposed in this note would employ the current deferential construction of the Due Process
Clause to regulatory takings. This deference would not only allow legislative "elbow room," but
it would also allow the Court to escape from the ad hoe takings determinations in a doctrinal field
full of conflicting precedent. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)
(taking) with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (no taking).
Due process analysis has the advantage of clear and coherent precedent, enabling legislatures
to avoid foreseeable constitutional pitfalls when enacting land use regulation. See, e.g., Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), discussed infra notes 187-99;
and more recently Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that zoning
ordinance restricting habitation of extended family in same home invalid under Due Process Clause);
Village of Belle Terre v. Borsas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (holding zoning ordinance restricting habitation
of non-family members valid); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 594 (1962) (holding
forced closing of gravel mine valid). See also Randall T. Shepard, Land Use Regulation in the
Rehnquist Court: The Fifth Amendment and Judicial Intervention, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 847, 869
(1989) (advocating a return to due process analysis).
29. See infra note 195 and authorities cited therein.
30. See infra notes 171-86 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 40-73 for a discussion of physical invasion takings.
32. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
33. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). Yee involved a physical invasion takings challenge in which the
Court unanimously agreed that no taking had occurred. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Yee. Lucas, a regulatory takings case, carried only a bare majority of five
Justices on the Opinion of the Court. See infra notes 118-65 for a discussion of Lucas. Comparing
simply the number of Justices supporting the majority opinion in Yee (nine) and Lucas (five) leads
to the inescapable conclusion that the Court is more divided on the proper resolution of regulatory
takings cases. The takings rule proposed in this note would address both the physical invasion and
regulatory takings contexts.
34. The rule proposed here would easily comport with most of the Court's takings
jurisprudence. Where takings have been found by the Court, the landowner may have also been
deprived of due process. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding
that denial of exception to zoning ordinance denied landowner due process). In the Court's most
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Part II of this Note will review the development of both the physical
invasion takings doctrine and the current test for regulatory takings, Justice
Scalia's means/end nexus, to demonstrate that this test signals a return to the
economic due process analysis of Lochner.5 Part Ill of this Note will explore
the Lucas decision to show how the Court has cemented itself into a return to
Lochner, as well as to show that judicial superlegislation, is no longer the
abstract fear it was in 1987.11 Part IV of this Note will discuss why the text
of the Constitution, nineteenth-century police power cases, and Justice Holmes's
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal all reject current takings jurisprudence and its
return to Lochner.3" Finally, after showing that no justifications exist for the
stricter scrutiny of Justice Scalia's nexus test, Part V of this Note will conclude
with a proposed new approach for regulatory takings that uses both the Takings
Clause and the Due Process Clause.39
II. CABLEBOXES AND A BEACHFRONT BUNGALOW: THE RECENT
EVOLUTION AND BIFURCATION OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
A. Physical Invasion Takings-Development of the Loretto Rule
The current Court has recognized those regulations "where the government
authorizes physical occupation of property (or actually takes title)" as a separate
recent decisions, Yee and Lucas, the proposed test would change the result only in Lucas. The
developmental ban in Lucas would likely survive due process scrutiny as applied in land use
contexts. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
In Yee the Court correctly applied the Loretto rule, see infra notes 53-66 and accompanying
text, and held that the composite effects of the rent control ordinance and the mobile home law did
not authorize a permanent physical occupation. If the Court adopted the proposed test, takings
challenges would be limited to those contemplated in Yee, and cases formerly considered regulatory
takings challenges would be analyzed under the Due Process Clause and its deferential review
standard.
35. See infra notes 87-117 and accompanying text. Professor Frank I. Michelman disagrees
with the assertion that Scalia's decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987), implicates a return to Lochner. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 1609. Michelman attempts
to limit Nollan's application to development exactions that allow permanent physical occupations.
Accord Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor
Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1648 (1988) [hereinafter Original Understanding] (concluding
that Nollan is not Lochner revisited); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of the Natural Law of
Property, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 367, 377-78 (1991) [hereinafter Natural Law] (Nollan's means-ends
nexus requirement was accepted judicial standard, while Lochner's superlegislation was not). But
see David A. Myers, Some Observations on the Analysis of Regulatory Takings in the Rehnquist
Court, 23 VA.. U. L. REv. 527 (1988) (contending that uncertainty exists as to when Nollan's
higher scrutiny will apply).
36. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
37. See infra notes 118-65 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 171-217 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
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category of takings.*° In physical invasion takings cases, the Court applies "a
clear rule"4' that requires the government to pay compensation to burdened
landowners. The Court has not always authorized compensation under this rule,
but government occupation has historically been a consideration for the Court
in determining whether a taking has occurred.42
The evolution of the clear, per se 3 takings rule for physical invasions
began with Kaiser-Aetna v. United States." In Kaiser-Aetna, a development
company challenged as a taking the federal government's proposed opening,
under its regulatory powers, of a private marina to the public." The Court,
with then-Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority, held that the government
owed compensation for the taldng of essentially a public easement in the
marina.' Though Congress did have the power to assure public access,47
Congress could not freely authorize public trespass onto what remained private
property.' Congress did have an interest in maintaining free access to
interstate waters.49 However, the mere presence of a public interest in private
40. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1525 (1992).
41. Id.
42. Consideration of government-authorized trespasses onto private property has traditionally
fallen under the "character of governmental action" test. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). In Penn Central, after citing the familiar disclaimer that the Court
has no "set formula" for takings analysis, id., the Court, per Justice Brennan, added that among the
several factors that the Court employs in takings cases is the character of the governmental action:
"A taking may be more readily found when the interference with property can be characterized as
a physical invasion by the government... than when the inference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." Id. In other
words, Justice Brennan devised a rough dichotomy between trespassory or physical invasions and
mere regulatory exercises of the police power. The case cited by Brennan for this proposition was
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), in which a landowner alleged that his property, a
chicken farm, had been deprived of all viable use due to constant low overflights by government
aircraft. The Court agreed with the landowner's characterization of the government action as
trespassory, not regulatory, and ordered compensation.
43. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982). A physical
invasion does not effect a per se taking unless the invasion is permanent. See PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that temporary imposition of demonstrators in shopping
mall is not a taking.) For convenience, the terms "Loretto rule" and "per se taking" will be used
interchangeably.
44. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
45. The district court found that the marina was navigable federal water for the purpose of
Congressional regulatory power, but that it was not federally owned water in the sense that its
opening to the public required no compensation. 408 F. Supp. 42 (D. Haw. 1976). The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision and held that the opening of the marina required no
compensation. 584 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1978).
46. 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979).
47. Id. at 174.
48. Id. at 176.
49. Id. at 175.
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property-an interest that only arose after the landowner had improved the
marina and linked it to the ocean-could not transfer private marina control from
the landowner to the government and its authorized trespassers, the public.
The Court found a taking because Justice Rehnquist focused the Court's
attention upon "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property-the right to exclude others. " By
characterizing the right of the landowner to keep its property free from uninvited
public visitors as "a universally held . . . fundamental element" of property
ownership,"' the Court decided that compensation was due for any
encroachment by the public on this right of exclusivity, even if sanctioned by the
government. 52
From the decision in Kaiser-Aetna, where physical invasion by the
government created a weighty presumption in favor of compensation to protect
a landowner's right to exclude, the Court created a per se rule for physical
invasion takings in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.5 3 In
Loretto, a landowner sued a cable television operator, alleging that the
installation of a cable box which measured one-third square foot on the
landowner's roof, pursuant to state law, constituted a compensable taking.'
The Supreme Court reversed the state court decision finding no taking.'5
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, began the Court's inquiry by
acknowledging that generally, takings decisions relied upon no formal rules.'
Marshall, as had Rehnquist in Kaiser-Aetna, then turned the Court's attention
50. Id. at 176.
51. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (exclusivity is an essential element of property ownership) cited by the Court for this
proposition.
52. Justice Blackmun dissented on the ground that the Court could only make the decision
whether a navigational easement could be imposed without compensation after a balancing of the
public and private interests in the marina. Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 187 (1979).
Blackmun felt that Congress's interest in regulating interstate waters outweighed any private
exclusionary interest or a desire for compensation after having sacrificed considerable investment
in development. Id. at 189-90.
53. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
54. The cable box had been installed pursuant to a state law prohibiting landowners from
interfering with cable installation. The state trial court granted summary judgment to the cable
operator, and the appellate court affirmed this decision. 422 N.Y.S.2d 550 (A.D. 1979). The New
York Court of Appeals held that the statute served a legitimate police power purpose by facilitating
the dissemination of an important educational resource, cable television. 423 N.E.2d 320 (N.Y.
1981). Additionally, the state court held that the relatively unobtrusive box had in no appreciable
measure adversely affected the landowner's economic interest in the property, and thus the
government owed no compensation. Id. at 425.
55. Loreto, 458 U.S. at 442.
56. Id. at 426-27 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
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to the portion of the Penn Central opinion that stated that the character of the
government action was a consideration to be weighed in a takings analysis,
especially if this government action could be characterized as a physical
invasion." Justice Marshall's opinion then created a new category of
regulations that always triggers the compensation requirement: "[Wihen the
physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation,
a taking has occurred."' In such a case, the "character of the governmental
action not only is an important factor in resolving whether the action works a
taking but also is determinative."5 9
Applying this rule to the facts of Loretto, only one result became possible.
The state statute prohibited the landowner from removing the cable box from the
property. By authorizing, or more properly mandating, this physical invasion
by the cable operator, the statute effected a taking. The diminutive size of the
box had no bearing upon the decision that a taking had occurred.' The
determinative factor remained the characterization of the government-authorized
invasion as permanent.6' Once the government has physically invaded private
property permanently, a per se taking requiring compensation under Loretto has
occurred.
The reasoning behind the Loretto decision merely extended that of Kaiser-
Aetna. In Kaiser-Aetna, the Court focused upon the right to exclude.5 When
government regulation impinges upon this right, the Court will more likely find
a taking because exclusivity is a fundamental incident of property ownership.'
Though the invasion in Kaiser-Aetna could not be characterized as permanent,
and thus would not have triggered application of Loretto's per se rule,' the
difference between the invasion in both cases is a matter of degree. Where the
government action in Kaiser-Aetna only implicated the right to exclude, the
regulation in Loretto did not "simply take a single 'strand' from the 'bundle' of
property rights: it chop[ped] through the bundle taking a slice from every
strand. "65 Permanent physical occupation deprives landowners not only of the
57. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). See also
supra note 42.
58. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
59. Id. The physical-invasion takings doctrine eschews the general liberal/conservative
characterization of the Court's members. Justice Marshall, usually considered a liberal, found aper
se taking in Loretto while Justice Blackmun, considered a moderate liberal, found no taking.
60. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 437. Size, or the extent of the physical invasion, may have some
relevance to the amount of compensation to be paid.
61. Id. at 434-35.
62. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
64. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
65. Id. at 435.
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right to exclude, but also of the rights to use and dispose of property.'
The Court applied the Loretto rule most recently in Yee v. City of
Escondido.67  In Yee, a mobile home park owner challenged as an
unconstitutional taking a municipal rent control ordinance setting a ceiling on
rents chargeable to mobile home park tenants.' With Justice O'Connor
66. Id. at 435. The Court characterized these rights, as well as the landowner's expectation
in exercising these rights, as traditional restraints on government's ability to physically occupy
private property, and the rule that resulted from protecting these rights as a traditional rule. Id. at
441. C. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (holding that retention of rights to possess and
transport personal property weighs against finding a taking). Whether this rule that any permanent
physical occupation by the government works a taking has the historical pedigree that the Court
asserted in Loretto remains open to debate. Surely, the Court had never explicitly stated this rule
before Loretto. Prior cases had merely held that a physical invasion was a factor to be considered
in the takings analysis. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 43 U.S. 104, 124 (1978);
supra note 42.
Even assuming the per se takings rule has the support of history, such a history may be a
disadvantage, according to Justice Blackmun's dissent in Loretto. Creation of a fixed, perse takings
rule has the tendency to freeze the common law in its nineteenth-century form, leaving no flexibility
for governmental interference of any extent. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 455. However, reliance on
history at the expense of sound judicial doctrine (see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112
S. Ct. 2886 (1992); infra notes 150-55) does not pose a similar problem for the per se rule. The
line-drawing in Loretto serves a useful purpose because the line is concrete and easily identifiable
at the moment of physical occupation. This approach also has the support of the framer's intent.
See infra notes 171-86 and accompanying text. By advancing the cause of certainty in constitutional
guarantees, the per se rule can only help protect property in its constitutional dimension.
67. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
68. The rent control ordinance alone did not animate the landowner's physical invasion takings
challenge. To provide further protection for mobile home dwellers, the state had also enacted the
Mobilehome Residency Law, which prevented mobile home park owners from actually or
constructively evicting tenants under certain circumstances. Working together, these regulations both
prevented park owners from removing unwanted tenants, and prevented rent increases to remove
undesirable tenants or to insulate mobile home parks from the incursion of new undesirable tenants.
The landowner challenged only the constitutionality of the rent control ordinance.
In substance, the landowner's takings claim alleged that the combined effect of the regulations
forced him to accept potentially unwanted tenants at deflated rents, which violated his right of
exclusivity. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. Because the rent control ordinance
deflated rents collectable from mobile home tenants, and the residency law restricted when park
owners could evict these tenants, the landowner alleged not only that his right to exclude had been
taken, but also that such forced association between park owners and tenants resulted in a permanent
transfer of wealth, in the form of higher rents that new tenants would pay, from park owners to
tenants. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1528. The California Supreme Court denied review of the landowner's
claims. 274 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1990).
Yee was not controlled by Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); see infra notes 105-
17; another rent control takings case, because the landowner in Yee advanced a physical invasion
takings theory before the Court, whereas Pennell involved a regulatory takings challenge. Had
Pennell applied, its precedential value would have been minimal nonetheless. The applicability of
one rent control takings case to subsequent rent control cases rests upon the similarity of the
underlying ordinances. Because different municipalities address the problem of exorbitant rents in
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writing for a unanimous panel, the Court held that the physical invasion rule of
Loretto only applied when the government required the landowner to acquiesce
to a trespass.' Because the government had not chosen the park owner's
tenants, the Loretto rule could not help the landowner.' Additionally, the
mere transfer of wealth from park owner to tenant did not convert a police
power regulation into a physical invasion requiring compensation.' Plainly,
the Court meant to compensate only real, tangible permanent physical invasion
by the government when it promulgated the Loretto rule; Yee simply applied this
rule, finding no taking.'
B. Regulatory Takings-Justice Scalia Builds the New Lochner
Yee identified the two distinct classes of takings cases: physical invasion
takings and regulatory takings. 4 The regulatory takings doctrine involves a
much more complex inquiry than whether a permanent physical invasion has
occurred. " The Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence, which has garnered
most of the Court's attention on takings,76 remains muddled, at best. At its
different ways, similarities would seem unlikely. Compare the rent control ordinance in Yee, 112
S. Ct. at 1522 with the rent control ordinance in Penne//, 485 U.S. at 1.
69. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1528.
70. Id. at 1530.
71. Id. at 1528-29.
72. The Court prudentially refused to reach the question of whether the cumulative effects of
the regulations resulted in a regulatory taking because the landowner had not raised the regulatory
taking issue in the state court below. Id. at 1531-34.
73. Yee assuaged any doubts that the Loreno rule would be manipulated by clever landowners
trying to fashion a regulatory impact upon their property into a physical invasion. What Loretto
never made clear, as Justice Blackmun's dissent indicates, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 445-51, and Yee failed to address, was how the Court would deal with
temporary physical invasions. Largely this question seems academic. In the absence of a permanent
physical invasion, and therefore without the benefits of theper se rule for a landowner, the character
of government action factor under Penn Central, see supra note 42, would still weigh in favor of
finding a taking under the Court's takings analysis. The right to exclude emphasized in Kaiser-
Aetna, see supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text, would also militate toward finding a taking.
Once a taking is found, whether temporary or permanent, compensationis due from the government.
See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, California, 482 U.S. 304
(1987); infra note 241.
74. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1525 (1992).
75. See Loreno, 458 U.S. at 419.
76. Of the five takings decisions issued in 1987 and 1992, only one-Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1522-
involved a physical invasion takings challenge. The remainder were regulatory takings cases.
The regulatory takings doctrine has elicited spirited commentary from considerable numbers
of legal scholars as well. See generaly BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTITImON (1977); FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); RICHARD EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMMIN (1985); Douglas A. Humbach,
A Unifyng Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34
RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1982); Michelman, supra note 1; Michelman, supra note 21; Andrea L.
Freitag: Takings 1992: Scalia's Jurisprudence and a Fifth Amendment Doctri
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994
756 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
worst, the regulatory takings doctrine is a confusing legal briarpatch of
disregarded or manipulated precedent,' unsupported rule-making, s and even
plain judicial error.' Justice Brennan, in trying to synthesize more than half
a century of regulatory takings cases, could not distill coherent standards' and
could only offer several vague considerations that the Court had previously
examined to determine whether a taking had occurred.8 ' Where the Court once
cited Justice Holmes's "too far" test with mantric reverence, Justice
Brennan's all-too-candid remark that the Court has no "set formula"' for
deciding takings cases has gradually displaced the Holmes test. Additionally,
Brennan's remark exposes the Court's doctrinal difficulties by admitting that the
real test for a regulatory taking is no test at all. As a remedy for this lack of
direction or doctrine in the takings arena, Justice Scalia has introduced a new
takings test, setting the stage for a return to Lochner's strict scrutiny of
regulatory legislation.
The case that first raised the specter of Lochner was also Scalia's first
takings opinion, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.'4 In Nollan, a
landowner planned to develop his beachfront property, replacing a small one-
story bungalow with a considerably larger two-story home. The state regulatory
commission charged with overseeing coastal development found that the
proposed development would create a visual and psychological barrier to beach
access for passersby. To increase overall public beach access, the commission
Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Pan I-A Critique of Current
Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (1989); Joseph A. Sax, Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, supra note 11; William B. Stoebuck, A General
Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553 (1971); Stoebuck, supra note 11.
77. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) with Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). Similar regulations from the same state yielded
opposite findings under the Court's regulatory takings analysis.
78. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); infra notes 84-104. The
stricter scrutiny proposed by Scalia for regulatory takings analysis had no precedential support.
79. See Agins v. City of Tiberon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (takings analysis requires a
weighing of public and private interests). The balancing of public and private interests is not proper
for a takings analysis. If private property has indeed been taken, the presence of even the weightiest
public interest will not undo the taking, and therefore will not avoid the compensation requirement.
Balancing is proper under the Due Process Clause. See Stoebuck, supra note 11, at 1065-66.
80. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
81. These considerations included the impact of the regulation, the degree to which the
regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations, the character of the governmental action,
average reciprocity of advantage, and the degree to which the regulation seeks to prevent harm to
other private property. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For
an analysis and explanation of Justice Brennan's use of these terms, see generally Myers, supra note
35.
82. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
83. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
84. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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conditioned the grant of a permit on the dedication of a lateral easement of
public access across the landowner's property, parallel to the shore. The
landowner challenged this development condition as unconstitutional.
The Court found that the imposition of the access condition effected an
unconstitutional taking.sa Justice Scalia, writing for a five justice majority,
began the Court's decision by attempting to characterize the condition as a
physical invasion. He cited Loretto' for the proposition that the easement, by
forcing continuous public access, violated the right to exclude,u although the
condition allowed no individual members of the public to permanently station
themselves on the property.s" Seemingly, Justice Scalia found that the
easement condition violated the per se takings rule,'o but he chose not to rest
the Court's decision upon Loretto's shoulders.9'
Justice Scalia instead inquired whether the fact that the easement could not
have been appropriated directly by the state without compensation rendered the
indirect appropriation of the easement through a development condition a
taking.' This portion of Justice Scalia's opinion abandoned the apparently
dispositive physical invasion aspect of the case and focused upon the regulatory
takings doctrine, where he completely altered the Court's analysis. Justice
85. The trial court agreed with the landowner that the commission had not advanced sufficient
reasons to show how a lateral easement would remedy the problem of limited visual access, and thus
declared the development condition void. Id. at 829. The state appellate court reversed the trial
court's decision invalidating the development condition, finding that any development condition that
debatably contributed to overall public access, albeit indirectly, satisfied the Takings Clause. Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 30-31 (1986). Further, the court held that the
condition imposed did not deprive the landowner of a reasonable use of his property. Id. at 30. The
landowner appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
86. Id. at 842.
87. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). See also notes 53-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Loreno.
88. Nolan, 483 U.S. at 831.
89. Id. at 832.
90. Id. If not directly violative of Lorerro's per se rule, at least the condition in Nolan would
seem to bring the case within the rule of Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). This
rule, essentially a pre-Loretto formulation for physical invasion takings, creates a presumption that
a taking has occurred if a landowner's right to exclude is impinged. See supra notes 44-52 and
accompanying text. On the similarity of their respective facts, Kaiser-Aema would seem to dispose
of Nolan: allowing public navigation in a private marina from time to time is analogous to allowing
public passage over private beachfront property from time to time. In neither case was an individual
member of the public permanently fixed upon the regulated property, but in both cases the regulation
limited the right to exclude.
91. Seemingly Justice Scalia felt that a per se taking served as an insufficient basis for decision,
and he chose Nolan as an opportunity to produce a new takings test. Scalia probably felt that he
could not neatly characterize the conditional developmental ban as a physical occupation.
92. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
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Scalia began by citing Agins v. City of Tiburon93 for the innocuous proposition
that a regulation does not effect a taking if it "substantially advances" a
legitimate state interest and does not "deny the owner an economically viable use
of his land. "I
Where courts had previously focused upon the legitimacy of the asserted
state interest, Justice Scalia turned the Court's analysis toward the requirement
that the regulation substantially advance this interest. 5  In footnote three,"
Scalia stated that the Court would no longer use a deferential standard requiring
only a rational relation between the means and the ends of government
regulation97 in analyzing regulatory takings challenges. Instead, his opinion
93. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Agins involved a takings challenge to a zoning ordinance in which
the Court found that no taking had occurred. Ripeness also weighed against finding a taking; see
infra note 108.
94. Id. at 260. This language is perhaps inapplicable to takings analysis because the
"substantially advance" prong comes from the zoning and due process case of Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). Nectow does not employ the Takings Clause, and the decision
is an anomaly because it invalidated a zoning ordinance in the wake of Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (generally upholding zoning as a rational exercise of the police
power). Nonetheless, accepting Neciow as at least a distant cousin of regulatory takings cases, its
standard of judicial review is no higher in substance than that of minimum rationality. See supra
note 6. See also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 844 n.1 (Brennan, I., dissenting) ("Our phraseology [of
takings scrutiny] may differ slightly from case to case . . . . These minor differences cannot,
however, obscure the fact that the inquiry in each case is the same."). Though Justice Brennan used
the word "substantially" in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978),
his approach to this word differed from that taken by Scalia in Nollan.
95. By so altering the Court's inquiry, Scalia relegated the ends of the regulation to the
background, while he focused solely in the foreground upon the means used to advance these ends.
See Nolan, 483 U.S. at 837. This approach raises the specter of economic due process. Many of
the members of the Lochner Court would have undoubtedly accepted state goals such as ensuring
worker safety as noble and worthwhile ends. See supra note 3 and cases cited therein. However,
these same judges invalidated many such regulations because they felt that business should not have
to bear the costs of such regulation, i.e., they questioned the means that the state had contemplated
to advance its ends. See supra note 3. Presumably, Justice Scalia even would have very little
apprehension in recognizing preservation of public beach access as a legitimate state interest.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841. Justice Scalia though, like some of his more conservative predecessors,
disagrees with imposing the cost of this regulation through an access condition to the detriment of
private development. Id. at 841-42.
96. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.3 (1987).
97. In Nollan itself, Justice Scalia's lean toward heightened scrutiny comes by rejecting, in
footnote three, Justice Brennan's suggestion in dissent that the inquiries under the Takings, Due
Process, and Equal Protection Clauses are essentially the same. Compare id. at 834 n.3 (Scalia, J.)
("our opinions do not establish that these [takings] standards are the same as those applied to due
process or equal protection claims") with id. at 844 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
Our consideration of [takings] factors . . . provides an analytical framework for
protecting the values underlying the Takings Clause, and other distinctive approaches
are utilized to give effect to other constitutional provisions. This is far different,
however, from the use of different standards of review to address the threshold issue of
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mandated a much more searching inquiry into the substantiality of the
relationship between the asserted government interest and the means chosen by
the state to serve that interest."
Nollan's most notorious contribution to the regulatory takings doctrine
remains not so much the standard of review adopted by Justice Scalia, as his
actual application of this standard. The minimal extraction of a lateral passage
easement did not pass Justice Scalia's scrutiny. Specifically, Scalia found that
the lateral easement did not address the problem identified by the commission
with more intense development: reduced visual access to the beach. 9 The
microscopic examination to which Justice Scalia submitted the development
condition not only allowed private sector development without restriction, but
also advanced with it a nearly fundamental right of private real estate
development that the Court had never before recognized. '°°
the rationality of government action.
Scalia's new scrutiny is itself questionable, but one of the cases he cites to support it, see id.
at 834, is Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (1978) ("use
restriction may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
government purpose"). Presumably, Brennan did not have the kind of strict scrutiny Scalia
propounds in mind when he wrote Penn Central. Penn Central was exceedingly deferential in
reviewing a landmark preservation ordinance and may even be characterized as a case hostile to
development rights because the Court there found no taking. Justice Brennan never employed the
phrase "substantially advance" to refer to the degree to which the means of achieving this interest
must be advanced, Noltan, 842 U.S. at 843, i.e., Brennan never intended to require a close causal
nexus between the landowner's use and the problem regulated.
98. Justice Scalia added substance to "substantially advance" as used in Agins. In other words,
he refused to equate "substantially advance" with the classic deferential review standard for takings
challenges, and instead equated substantial with nearly compelling. See infra note 99.
99. Here Scalia's higher scrutiny manifests itself in practice: "[Ulniess the permit condition
serves the same governmental purpose as the developmental ban, the building restriction is not a
valid regulation of land use but an out-and-out plan of extortion." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. Scalia
requires an unrealistically tight fit between the ends of the regulation (remedying the lack of visual
access) and the means advanced in the regulation to solve this problem (permitting condition
allowing lateral access to the public). The example of a regulation that would pass this scrutiny, a
visual easement from the street to the beach, does not benefit the public to a sufficient degree to
make regulation worthwhile. The takings doctrine has never before required such narrow tailoring.
See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (holding that denial of development permit is not a taking
in part because developmental rights are transferable to other non-restricted property)..
100. But cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), infra notes 118-
65 and accompanying text. Some legal scholars have attempted to cabin the Nollan decision by
refusing to equate Justice Scalia's approach in limiting the range of constitutional government
activity as a return to Lochner. See Michelman, supra note 1; Original Understanding, supra note
35. These commentators emphasize that although the language of Nollan is broad, the holding is
narrow. See also Myers, supra note 35. Whether these scholars are merely justifying Scalia's
opinion or correctly reading Nollan is open to debate. Surely, the former seems more likely when
Nollan could have been decided as a physical invasion case. See supra notes 87-91 and accom-
panying text.
Ironically, Justice Scalia has been hesitant to recognize non-textual rights in other, less
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Justice Brennan, in dissent, focused upon the rationality standard for
reviewing police power regulations and decried any stricter scrutiny."'
Moreover, he showed that even under heightened scrutiny, the lateral easement
condition passed constitutional muster. By characterizing the state interest as
increasing overall access-visual, psychological, and physical-of the public to
the beach," ° Brennan found a substantial nexus between the state interest and
the developmental condition, between end and means. " Most importantly
though, Justice Brennan argued for a more deferential standard of review to
provide legislatures with the necessary flexibility to address new problems in an
era of increasingly intense development threatening environmentally sensitive
areas such as shoreland.°4
The disturbing development of higher scrutiny in Nollan became even more
apparent in Pennell v. City of San Jose." In Pennell, a landowner challenged
a municipal rent control ordinance as a regulatory taking." 6 The Court, in an
economic, contexts. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (woman's pre-viability right
to terminate pregnancy) and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(biological father's right to visitation).
101. Justice Brennan even implicates Lochner. Nollanv. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 842 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("ITihe Court imposes a standard of precision for the
exercise of a State's police power that has been discredited for the better part of this century."). See
also id. at 846 (Scalia's "narrow conception of rationality has long since been discredited a judicial
arrogation of legislative authority").
102. Id. at 849-53.
103. Under the factors enunciated in Penn Central, Justice Brennan would have found that no
taking had occurred; see supra note 81. The regulation involved no denial of economically viable
use of the property because the landowner could still use the bungalow. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 845
n.2. The physical invasion was minimal because part of the easement already rested in the public
domain over shoreland. Id. at 853. The regulation involved an average reciprocity of advantage
because similar easements were required on other beachfront property, giving the landowner a right
to walk along beach property other than his own. Id. at 856. Finally, investment-backed
expectations were not a problem because the landowner purchased the land with knowledge of the
condition. Id. at 860.
104. Id. at 863, 864. Justice Blackmun also advocated this argument in a separate dissent. See
id. at 865.
105. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
106. The ordinance provided six objective factors to help determine at what rate landlords must
set their rents. Id. at 4-5. The ordinance also provided for consideration of a subjective factor,
tenant hardship, in determining a reasonable rent. Id. The landowner narrowed his constitutional
challenge to the subjective factor, arguing that consideration of such a soft variable could give the
municipality the opportunity for arbitrary enforcement of the ordinance. rd. at 9. This arbitrariness
could in turn result in "taking" rent properly assessed under the objective factors. Id. The trial
court held the ordinance unconstitutional, and the state appellate court affirmed this decision on the
grounds that the possibility of arbitrary enforcement made the ordinance unconstitutional. 201 Cal.
Rptr. 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). The California Supreme Court reversed. 721 P.2d 1111 (Cal.
1986).
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opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that no evidence existed in the
record to demonstrate that the rent control ordinance effected a taking."' 7 In
short, although the Court did not invoke the prudential limitation of ripeness"
to resist hearing the case on its merits, the decision rested upon an inadequate
factual record in which a taking could be found.
The importance of Pennell for this Note lies in the dissent of Justice Scalia.
Scalia would have found the rent control ordinance to work a taking." 9
Returning to the Nollan"O language that a regulation must "substantially
advance a legitimate state interest" to avoid a successful takings challenge,"'
Justice Scalia once again imposed a higher level of scrutiny to a regulation
challenged as a taking. Scalia embellished upon his nexus test to require a
"cause-and-effect relationship between the property restricted by the regulation
and the social evil that the regulation seeks to remedy."" 2 The thrust of this
new language is that government must meet a high standard of judicial review
by showing a close fit between the regulation imposed and a need for this
regulation caused by the burdened landowner."'
107. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 10. No taking had occurred for the obvious fact that no proprietary
interest had been deprived of the landowner. Id. Additionally, the Court held that the landowner's
facial challenge to the ordinance under the Due Process Clause also failed because fixing rents was
a rational exercise of the police power. Id. at 12-13. The Court did not hold that any consideration
of subjective factors would be impermissible, even on an applied challenge. The issue of the extent
to which consideration of subjective factors would result in a taking as applied was therefore
reserved by the Court.
108. See, e.g., Williamson Planning Comm'nv. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186-87(1985).
In Williamson, the Court held that a takings clause claim is not ripe until the government has decided
that the regulation actually applies to the landowner's property. Id. at 186. See also Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
109. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 15.
110. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
111. Noilan, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980)).
112. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1989). In other words, the landowner must
be the cause of the harmful effects that the regulation is imposed to rectify. In Justice Scalia's
opinion, the rent control ordinance did not meet this test because the landowner had not caused the
hardship experienced by the tenants.
113. Whether it is termed cause-and-effect, means/ends scrutiny, or a nexus requirement, this
intensified review standard lacks precedential support. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 844 n.l. The danger
of the Court imposing its own judgment upon the wisdom of legislative enactments is equally
manifest because the Court conducts its own independent review to determine the extent to which
a regulation addresses a given social evil. The possibility for abuse could come from a Court whose
members considered a regulation particularly onerous or ideologically wrong. Such a Court would
find that the regulation failed to adequately address the problem regulated.
The current Court, or at least Justice Scalia, imposes the burden of proof on the government
to justify regulation to the satisfaction of the Court before the regulation will pass constitutional
muster. But the burden correctly rests upon the landowner to establish that a regulation effects an
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Justice Scalia attempted to justify this cause-and-effect test by referring to
the time-honored taking's maxim that "a landowner may not be singled out to
bear public burdens . . .that should be borne by the public as a whole.""
4
But Scalia's citation of this passage is misleading. The whole purpose behind
police power legislation is the promotion of the health, safety, and general
welfare of the polity." 5  This power entails impeding some citizens' rights,
and necessarily their property, for the benefit of others." 6 By citing Armstrong
v. United States for the blanket proposition that the Takings Clause affords
protection to singled-out and uniquely disadvantaged landowners, Scalia
attempted to revive Lochner's appeal to the contract liberties of singled-out
businesses."' In any event, a careful reading of Nollan and Justice Scalia's
unconstitutional taking. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485
(1987). This is the meaning of the presumption of constitutional validity generally, and properly
afforded to police power legislation. See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct.
2886, 2909 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 22 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960)). This
"guiding principle of the Takings Clause," Pennell, 485 U.S. at 23, is often referred to as the equal
protection arm of takings jurisprudence. See Original Understanding, supra note 35, at 1652-53;
Note, Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 102 HARV. L. REV. 448, 451 (1988). The argument proceeds that the government,
by taking without compensation, unfairly singles out particular landowners, and that these
landowners deserve the protection of the Takings Clause. Justice Scalia mentioned this argument
in Nollan, but failed to develop it fully. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.4. Reading equal protection
under the law into the Takings Clause is unpersuasive. An equal protection violation could be
addressed sufficiently by the Equal Protection Clause, and the construction given to it by the Court
requires strict judicial scrutiny only in the event of deprivation of a group's fundamental rights or
suspect classifications under a legislative scheme. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
(1986) (fundamental right to vote) and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (suspect racial classification).
In opposition to the "equal protection" argument that an individual should not alone bear
burdens more properly assigned to society stands Justice Brennan's suggestion that a regulation is
valid if it merely adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
115. See supra note 11 and authorities cited therein.
116. Here, the question of when compensation will be required becomes apparent. In the
context of a broad city-wide rent control ordinance, Justice Scalia's argument in favor of finding a
compensable taking falls on deaf ears. No landlord is uniquely disadvantaged in comparison to
others engaged in the same business, because all landlords have the factor of tenant hardship to
potentially lower rents. The fact that a single landlord with more tenants suffering hardship bears
more of a burden than other landlords does not, without more, require compensation as a taking.
See Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (finding no taking when only landowners with parcels
designated as landmarks burdened by regulation). Bearing this in mind, the Armstrong equal
protection argument seems more appropriate in a physical invasion context.
117. Even Justice Scalia would not go this far. In his Pennell dissent, he does recognize some
instances when an exercise of the police power will survive his scrutiny, e.g., zoning set-back
restrictions in residential neighborhoodsand emergency price controls. Pennell v. City of San Jose,
485 U.S. 1, 20 (1989). He justifies these requirements as "traditional land-use controls. * Id. But
price control measures would also violate the Takings Clause under Scalia's nexus test because
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Pennell dissent together in this light leads arguably to the conclusion that Justice
Scalia has drastically changed the regulatory takings doctrine. This change
continued in 1992, as higher scrutiny became the touchstone of takings
jurisprudence.
I. LucAs v. SOUTH CAROUA COASTAL COUNCIL
Slightly more than two months after the Court denied a physical invasion
takings challenge in Yee, the Court reentered the takings arena, entertaining a
regulatory takings challenge in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council."'
Lucas addressed the constitutionality of the South Carolina Beachfront
Management Act (BMA) against a takings claim brought by a developer,
Lucas. n9 In a majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held that
the regulation tentatively"2 effected a compensable taking. Scalia began his
opinion by invoking the familiar Pennsylvania Coal formulation of the regulatory
market failures, not exorbitant prices, are the cause of the consumer hardship problem that
legislatures attempt to correct with price controls.
Mere historical acceptance does not, without more, measure constitutionality. If these
traditional police power exercises can be accepted, then why not less traditional uses of the police
power? See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (developmental ban
for beachfront property). Tradition does not justify traditional exercises of the police power. The
policies behind the police power-regulationin the interests of health and general welfare-do. See
supra note 11.
118. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
119. Lucas had purchased and developed shoreland on one of South Carolina's barrier islands
in the late 1970s. As development of the property came to a profitable close, Lucas purchased two
additional parcels nearby in 1986 for development of single-family residences. When Lucas made
this purchase, these parcels were unencumbered by building restrictions under state environmental
protection laws.
However, in 1988, the South Carolina legislature amended its coastal zone legislation with the
BMA. The BMA prohibited construction of "occupiable improvements" near a line drawn parallel
to the shore by the coastal council. Id. at 2889. Unfortunately for Lucas, his two parcels fell
within the restricted property. Lucas immediately sought the aid of the courts, contending that
although the BMA was a valid exercise of the state's police power, it had completely destroyed his
investment in these parcels by prohibiting development. Lucas asserted that the state owed him
compensation of $1.2 million.
The trial court agreed with Lucas, finding that the developmental ban rendered his parcels
"valueless." Id. at 2890. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the absence
of a challenge to the statute's purpose, which Lucas had already admitted as valid, the legislative
findings that development threatened a public resource fended off a successful takings challenge.
Relying on Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), discussed infra notes 187-99, the state supreme
court reasoned that legislation directed at the prevention of public harm, like the DMA, constituted
a valid exercise of the police power. As such, the BMA was valid under the Takings Clause even
if the property's developmental value had been destroyed. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 436.
120. The Court's holding was qualified because the case was remanded to the state courts to
determine whether "traditional" state property law allowed such regulation of land use. See infra
notes 150-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Scalia's "traditional" rule.
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takings doctrine' and the equally familiar disclaimer by Justice Brennan that
the Court recognizes no "set formula" in its takings decisions. 2 But quickly
enough, Justice Scalia continued his alteration of takings clause jurisprudence by
announcing that the Court had formulated two categories of per se takingg'23
that did not require a case specific inquiry to find a taking: permanent physical
occupation authorized by the government as enunciated in Loretto, and the
previously unrecognized category of government regulation that "denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land." 4
Scalia supported his creation of this new and unprecedented class of per se
takings by referring to a landowner's "reasonable expectations" as "shaped by
the state's law of property."" Thus, by merely referring to state property
law, the Takings Clause may protect a landowner from regulations that eliminate
economic value if the value eliminated inheres to an estate with "a rich tradition
of protection at common law."' 2' Such a rule circumvents the normal case-
121. "[IJf a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
122. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
123. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), created a per se
takings rule that the compensation requirement of the Takings Clause is automatically triggered when
the government permanently physically invades private property. See supra notes 53-66 and
accompanying text. Before Lucas, this was the only per se takings rule ever explicitly recognized
by the Court.
124. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992). This second
category has never been categorized as a per se rule in the history of the Court's takings
jurisprudence, although Chief Justice Rehnquist intimated in 1987 that he would create such a rule.
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 517 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Ihere is no need for further analysis where the government by regulation extinguishes
the whole bundle of rights in an identifiable segment of property.").
The formulation of such a rule has always presented difficulties because the destruction of the
economic value of property lies in the eyes of the beholder. In other words, total deprivation of
economic value depends upon how the relevant property is defined. The Court could characterize
destruction of a one-acre lot of a hundred-acre parcel as either a one percent devaluation of the
larger tract or a total deprivation of one acre. This definitional problem may account for the
difference in the holdings in Pennsylvania Coal-where the Court found a total deprivation of a
smaller estate, even though the landowner held more property, and Keystone Bituminous-where the
Court regarded larger holdings as relevant. See also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (holding
that a regulation outlawing sale of endangered bird parts is not a taking because owners still retain
right to possess and transport). Certainly, the extent that a regulation diminishes economic value
is considered by the Court in the regulatory takings analysis, see, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
124 (Court will consider the "economic impact of the regulation"), but this consideration never
generated a category of automatic takings until Lucas. Even Scalia recognizes the problem inherent
in such a rule. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7 ("Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation
of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear
the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured.").
125. Id.
126. Id.
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by-case inquiry in takings cases.'" Justice Scalia dispensed with this method
of takings analysis by stating that when a regulation leaves no economic value
in the property, the Court can summarily conclude that the regulation is not a
valid exercise of the police power." When regulation eliminates property's
economic value, such regulation carries with it a presumptive purpose of
"pressing" private property "into some form of public service under the guise
of mitigating serious harm."n Scalia refused to recognize the fact that not
only regulation that eliminates economic value may look like the impressment
of private property for public service; most valid police power regulation also
bears this look."3
A more fundamental problem plagues Justice Scalia's new category in that
the only value whose elimination bothered the Court in Lucas was economic
value.' 3' The Court even decried regulation that forces landowners to submit to
regulations that leave property "economically idle."3 With this statement,
Scalia revealed his Lochnerian design for takings analysis. Land, and property
more generally, has more than economic value, but only economic value
receives the benefit of the Court's categorical rule. 33 Like the Lochner Court,
the current Court, led by Justice Scalia, exalts economic development at the
127. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
128. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992).
129. Id. at 2895.
130. Another example of valid police power regulation that may fall into Justice Scalia's newly
created category is zoning laws. Property owners displeased with their parcel's classification would
undoubtedly fail with a takings challenge if they alleged a taking on the ground that their property
had been impressed into public service. But Justice Scalia's opinion almost goes this far by asserting
that an environmental protection regulation, like a zoning ordinance, applied similarly to all coastal
property impresses into public service only that land most severely burdened by the neutral
regulation.
131. James W. Sanderson & Ann Mesmer, A Review of Regulatory Takings after Lucas, 70
DENVER U. L. REV. 497, 505 n.2 (1993).
132. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
133. Justice Stevens, in dissent, criticizes the economic-use bias of the majority opinion. Id.
at 2919 n.3 ("M[The Court offers no basis for its assumptionthat the only uses of property cognizable
under the Constitution are developmental uses."). Supporting economic productivity is not the
proper role of the Court though, especially when this endeavor neglects other values property may
have that may lend support to the legislation under attack.
In attempting to refute this assertion of a pro-development bias, Justice Scalia cited Loretto
for the proposition that non-economic interests are also recognized under the Constitution.
Fundamentally though, Loretto displays a similar concern for economic interests. Much of the
Loretto decision turns on the right to exclude and how impairment of this right can have adverse
consequences for a landowner in terms of the property's market and resale values. See Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATJ/ Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982). This economic slant is less
troublesome in the context of Loretto because exclusivity, not development, is the central concern
of the per se rule for physical invasions. This distinction between Loretto and Lucas comports with
the intent of the framers in the Takings Clause. See infra notes 171-86.
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expense of other valuable state interests." 4  Simply put, by not recognizing
other non-economic value in the property, the Court can more easily find a
taking and frustrate legislative initiatives.
Even with the development ban, Lucas's property had value: aesthetic and
recreational value. In no realistic sense, except perhaps economically," could
the Court state that Lucas had been deprived of all beneficial use of his
property. Calling the extinguishment of the right to develop property a complete
destruction of property value not only belittled beneficial uses that remained in
the property but also implicated a fee interest comprised of only a single
stick-developmental rights-not a bundle of rights.
Aside from trivializing the beneficial uses remaining in Lucas's property,
Justice Scalia's opinion also trivialized the state's interest in promulgating the
BMA. Scalia characterized this statute as an effort to maintain an aesthetically
pleasing shoreline." While this characterization comports with some of the
legislative findings,"" the legislature also explicitly found that the BMA would
"protect life and property by serving as a storm barrier," as well as preventing
further property damage caused by erosion due to more intense develop-
ment. " These findings would seem to put the BMA within the class of
traditional police power regulations, like the regulation in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,"39 that the Court had generally upheld, rather than
in a class with the development condition in Nollan." The Court obviously
disagreed. Although the state supreme court found that the BMA was a valid
exercise of the police power, the United States Supreme Court held not only that
the state court was mistaken, but also that the route taken by the state court to
reach its decision-due process analysis of police power regulations affecting
land use-was wrong.
The state supreme court based its holding upon Mugler v. Kansas.141
Mugler had held that any exercise of the police power was consonant with the
Takings Clause and that no exercise of the police power could warrant
134. See supra note 3.
135. Even this proposition can be disputed. Though the developmental ban prohibited the
construction of occupiable improvements, Lucas's property, if local zoning so allowed, could turn
a profit as a seasonal restaurant, a non-residential beach club, or a private nature preserve.
136. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2896 (1992).
137. Id. at 2896 n.10.
138. Id.
139. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). In Keystone Binuminous, the Court upheld the Subsistence Act,
which was designed to prevent coal companies from mining under inhabited structures and thereby
endangering life and property.
140. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
141. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See also infra notes 187-99 and accompanying text.
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compensation. Justice Scalia's opinion characterized Mugler as resting upon the
noxious use doctrine, 42 which held that exercises of the police power to enjoin
nuisance-like activity did not violate the Takings Clause. Then the Court
discarded Mugler to the dustbin of out-moded legal principles, 43 and in its
wake reintroduced the heightened scrutiny of Nollan.'" Scalia characterized
the noxious use doctrine as merely a precursor to the "substantially advances"
test of Agins,' 45 as modified by Nollan.'" Because noxious uses cause the
harm addressed by regulation, these cases would pass stricter constitutional
scrutiny. 47 The problem with raising this review standard in Lucas was that
Justice Scalia refused to agree with the state court's finding that the BMA was
designed to prevent the harm caused by beachfront development."s As such,
the state interest in the BMA was not great enough to pass the Nollan test.
After eschewing the noxious use doctrine and the harmlbenefit
distinction, 49 Justice Scalia introduced a modification of the Court's new
142. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (regulation enjoining
gravel mining in a residential neighborhood does not cause a compensable taking); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (state regulation mandating destruction of cedar trees to protect apple
trees does not effect a taking). In Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134
n.30 (1978), Justice Brennan broadened the scope of these cases by asserting that their holdings did
not merely allow injunctive relief from harmful land uses, but rather encouraged legislation that
adjusted private beneficial activity with public burdens.
143. In other words, Mugler joined cases like Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)
(invalidating territorial theory of personal jurisdiction), Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(holding that separate-but-equal public facilities for minorities satisfies Equal Protection Clause),
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that manufacturing cannot be regulated under
Commerce Clause), and of course, the case that Justice Scalia discreetly embraces, Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1902) (economic due process).
144. See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
146. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992).
147. See supra notes 84-117 for a discussion of stricter scrutiny.
148. The characterization of the BMA as non-harm-preventing is only instructive for the result
it yields under the Nollan standard. Under NoUan, those exercises of the police power formerly
understood as harm-preventing will more likely be non-compensable because they pass the
means/ends scrutiny. Justice Scalia, throughout much of the Lucas opinion, eschews the
harm/benefit distinction because the Court could consider any regulation as either harm-preventing
or benefit-conferring. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898. The regulation in Lucas itself could be termed
as either preventing harm to persons and property caused by beach erosion, or as conferring a
benefit to the public by preserving beaches. Such a characterization 'depends primarily upon one's
evaluation of the worth of competing uses of real estate." Id. That such a statement came from
Justice Scalia is ironic considering his rather myopic view of the valuable use of property. Id. at
2895. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
At any rate, Scalia's refusal to follow state legislative findings violates the principle of
deference to state lawmakers inherent in the Court's takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
149. See supra note 142.
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categorical rule: Regulations that deprive a landowner of all economically
beneficial use avoid a successful takings challenge only if the uses prohibited by
the regulations did not attach to the landowner's title under state property
law." Newly legislated regulations of property that restrict all economically
beneficial uses generally cannot stand in the face of the Takings Clause because
such restrictions generally do not derive solely from state property or nuisance
law.' A regulation that completely destroys the economic value of property
must merely duplicate the result of nuisance adjudication under state common
law."2 Because Lucas's property would probably not have been burdened by
a developmental ban to prevent shoreline erosion at common law, the BMA
failed under the Court's new rule.
The Court's holding, with the new categorical rule thus modified, freezes
state property rights at common law and constitutionalizes them, " 3 leaving
very little room for innovative legislators to regulate property for fear that a
regulation would extinguish too much property value, triggering the
compensation requirement. 54 This new rule exalts common law property
rights and holds them immune from legislative readjustments. A similar
rule-not about property rights, but about contract rights-began the Lochner
era. 155
150. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992).
151. Id. at 2900.
152. Id.
153. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 455 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (freezing common law rights as immune from regulatory revision
represents a return to Lochner, legislatures must be allowed room for "change in response to
changes in circumstance") (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring)); supra note 66. See also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2921 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting):
Arresting the development of the common law is not only a departure from our prior
decisions; it is also profoundly unwise. The human condition is one of constant learning
and evolution-both moral and practical. Legislatures implement that new learning; in
doing so they must often revise the definition of property and the rights of property
owners.
Id.
154. This problem is particularly serious in light of the different definitions of property that
courts may adopt. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. See also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2913
(Blackmun, ., dissenting):
[W]hether the owner has been deprived of all economic value of his property will
depend on [sic] how 'property" is defined. . . . "We have long understood that any
land-use regulation can be characterized as the 'total' deprivation of an aptly defined
entitlement. . . . Alternatively, the same regulation can always be characterized a
'partial' withdrawal from full, unencumbered ownership of the landholding affected by
the regulation. .. ."
155. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Justice Kennedy, concurring in the Court's judgment, would not have gone
to this extreme to find a taking: "The takings clause does not require a static
body of state property law."" 5 Instead, Justice Kennedy recognized that while
state property and nuisance principles provide the source of most landowners'
expectations when investing, the government still maintains some residual
authority to change these expectations. 5 ' Justice Kennedy would have found
a taking on the basis that the BMA frustrated Lucas's reasonable, investment-
backed expectations.'"
In dissent, Justice Blackmun disagreed with nearly every point made in the
course of Justice Scalia's majority opinion. Justice Blackmun would have
characterized the BMA as a statute addressed to preventing personal injuries, as
well as property damage, 59 and ultimately would have found that no taking
had occurred because the BMA had not totally deprived Lucas's property of
economic value. Justice Blackmun went further by stating that the Court had
repeatedly upheld regulations that destroy real property interests"W and had
never conditioned state regulation under the police power upon leaving "some
residual available use" in the regulated property.' 6' He also targeted the major
weakness of Justice Scalia's opinion. Although Justice Scalia rejected the
noxious use doctrine as allegedly susceptible to manipulation," he replaced
it with his common law rule that suffered from the same problem on two levels,
only one of which Justice Blackmun addressed.
First, the development of state common law involved the same kind of
decisions about noxious uses, harms, and benefits that Justice Scalia found so
troublesome. As Justice Blackmun phrases this criticism:
There is nothing magical in the reasoning of judges long dead. They
determined a harm in the same way as state judges and legislatures do
today. If judges in the 18th and 19th centuries can distinguish a harm
from a benefit, why not judges in the 20th century, and ifjudges, why
156. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992).
157. Id.
158. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (holding that
investment-backed expectations are a consideration for the Court's regulatory takings analysis).
Lucas would seem to fall within the Penn Central holding on investment-backed expectations that
weighed against finding a taking. In Penn Central, the landmark preservation law was enacted after
the landowners had already held their property for some time, and in Lucas the landowner had
similarly held his purchased property before the BMA went into effect.
159. See also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2925 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 489 n. 18, and cases
cited therein.
161. Lucas, 112S. Ct. at 2912.
162. Id. at 2898. See supra note 142.
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not legislatures?
Second, by the simple choice of the common law as the definitive source
of legislative abilities and limitations to enact regulations, Justice Scalia
demonstrated his own "evaluation of the worth of competing uses of real
estate. " 64 At common law, the fee simple was relatively free of regulatory
encumbrances. Reliance on the common law as the source for legislative
initiatives under the police power limits twentieth-century government to
nineteenth-century law when regulation in the public interest may be desperately
more necessary today. Justice Scalia advocated from the bench, sub silentio, an
unregulated fee simple, and therefore developmental rights, at the expense of
legislative efficacy, even while he purported to adhere to an expanded view of
the police power.165
In Nollan, Justice Scalia invoked the spirit of Lochner by reifying an
abandoned level of judicial scrutiny for government regulation not impeding
fundamental personal rights. 'I In Lucas, Justice Scalia embraced the corpse
of Lochner by legislating laissez faire economic development from the bench.
IV. SEEING LocHNER's GHOST IN SCALIA'S TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE AND
SEEING THE LIGHT IN MUGLER: A NEW TAMNGs ANALYSIS PROPOSED
With the threat of Lochnerian scrutiny looming over the Supreme Court's
regulatory takings doctrine, Justice Scalia has at least given a direction to the
Court's confused takings jurisprudence. No longer the "ragpicker's coat"1"
it seemed, the takings mantel once worn by Justice Holmes now resembles the
haunting, dusty robe that the Court has not dared to touch since 1937.'" Is
163. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2914 (1992). Justice Scalia's
opinion in Lucas suggests that courts, in applying the common law, are better suited than
legislatures, in applying their electoral mandate, to decide when compensation is required. David
Coursen, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Indirection in the Evolution of Takings Law,
22 ENVTL. L. REV. 10778, 10784 (1992). The Lucas common law approach is a tautology: no
takings occur when the legislature prohibits that which is already prohibited. John A. Humbach,
What's Behind the "Property Rights" Debate?, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 21, 32 (1992). N.b.,
Justice Blackmun in his dissent did not advocate a return to the harm/benefit distinction. Rather he
believed that the scope of the police power extended beyond the mere prevention of harms. See
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2912 n.13.
164. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898.
165. Id. at 2897.
166. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of personal liberties
in the modem constitutional scheme and their relation to the proper standard of judicial review.
167. See generally Stoebuck, supra note 11.
168. See supra note 5. The 1937 decision of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), is generally considered the death knell of the Lochner era.
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Lochner's apparent resurrection necessarily wrong?"6 Does strict scrutiny of
regulatory legislation really work the evils that Holmes foresaw in his Lochner
dissent?"t° Are the challenges facing legislatures in the 1990s really so novel
and daunting that deference should be given to new legislative initiatives?
Emphatically, yes.
A. The Lessons of History: Judicial Scrutiny of Land Use Regulations-
Originalism, the Nineteenth Century, and Justice Holmes
Strict scrutiny under the Takings Clause is misplaced because judicial
arrogance for the legislature was not intended by the framers. '7 When the Bill
of Rights was proposed, legislatures, especially in the states, exercised broad
powers over the property under their domain.'" The principle of Just
Compensation"7 was veritably unknown to most legislatures. Landowners
held their parcels at the will of the sovereign, subject to any regulation the
sovereign deemed appropriate.' 74 This sacrifice of private property for the
advantage of society served as a central tenet of the political ideology in the late
eighteenth century.' But also central to the American revolutionary struggle
and to the foundation of the American constitutional system stood a deep distrust
169. Professor Norman Karlin seems to think Lochner's revival is a step in the right direction
to provide "corrective justice." See Karlin, supra note 24, at 671.
170. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
171. See generally William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985); Sax, supra note
11; and Stoebuck, supra note 11.
172. Treanor, supra note 171, at 695. In fact, none of the states even proposed adding the
Takings Clause to the original Bill of Rights. Kmiec, supra note 35, at 367. This lack of concern
regarding compensation evinced by the states may be attributed to either an understanding by the
states their regulatory power over property was nearly total, or, as Professor Kmiec posits, a belief
by the states that natural law provided sufficient protection of property rights. Id.
Kmiec's argument fails to address the fact that only formal exercises of the eminent domain
power triggered compensation under the Takings Clause as eventually proposed. Stoebuck, supra
note 11, at 583. Perhaps Kmiec sees the regulatory takings doctrine as a natural law response to
the development of the active regulatory state. But if a property right has no basis in history, i.e.,
if landowners have no historically recognized right to be free from regulatory encumbrances upon
their property, even Justice Scalia would hold that the right should not be recognized. See Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
173. It has been written:
The fifth and fourteenth amendments require that a person receive "just compensation"
for property that has been taken by the state or federalgovernment. The Supreme Court
has said that the constitutional guarantee of just compensation is not a limitation in the
power of eminent domain, but only a condition of its exercise.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 11.14, at 447 (citing Long Island Water-Supply Co. v.
Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 689 (1897)).
174. Treanor, supra note 171, at 797.
175. Id. at 699.
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of governmental power and the celebration of the individual. 6
The Constitution's chief architect, James Madison, embodied this desire to
protect the individual from the grabbing hands of government. 17 Madison
authored the Fifth Amendment, and as originally drafted, the Takings Clause
applied only to a "direct physical taking [of an individual's private property] by
the federal government."" The clause extended only to exercises of the
power of eminent domain, in which government formally condemned private
property for the greater good of the polity.' Even with different language
as adopted, the Takings Clause did not contemplate less-noticeable
appropriations of property rights. In fact, with the history surrounding the
adoption of the Fifth Amendment, the framers would have likely balked at the
concept of a regulatory taking."s While the government could not physically
appropriate private property without compensation, mere regulation of the use
of property could not, in any concrete sense, be termed an appropriation for
public use, and thus would require no compensation."" Such regulation was
the cost of living under a government of laws. 2
Of course, the framers would have held beyond a cavil the notion that
landowners could not have their property rights changed by legislation
arbitrarily, nor could landowners be singled out for property regulation
arbitrarily."t To prevent these possibilities of legislative abuse of private
property, landowners retained protection from the dual sentinels of the Due
Process Clause and, eventually, the Equal Protection Clause.s 4 Accepting this
176. Id. at 701.
177. Id. at 694, 708.
178. Treanor, supra note 171, at 711.
179. Professor Joseph L. Sax would characterize the function of the Takings Clause as
.preventing arbitrary government action, rather than preserving the economic status quo.' Sax,
supra note 11, at 58.
180. See BOSSELMAN iT AL., supra note 76, at 104 (stating that the framers of the Takings
Clause were unconcerned with regulatory takings). See also John M. Walker, Common Law Rides
and Land Use Regulations: Lucas and Future Takings Juisprudence, 3 SETN HALL CONST. L.J.
1, 5 n.9 (1993).
181. Madison believed that "property" was a creature of positive law. As such, proprietary
rights depended upon government enactments for their very existence, despite the recognized need
for their protection. See Treanor, supra note 171, at 710 n.87, and accompanying text.
Presumably, if property rights arose only at the behest of government, the government could change
the nature of property rights through regulation without directly altering an individual's entitlement
to compensation for these rights if the government physically appropriated private property. See
also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2915 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("llndividual and consequential injuries to property resulting from regulation were
excluded from the definition of a taking.").
182. Treanor, supra note 171, at 701.
183. See Sax, supra note 11, at 58.
184. See supra note 8.
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original understanding of the Takings Clause and the nearly universal acceptance
of land-use regulation by the framers, Justice Scalia's heightened scrutiny in the
context of regulatory takings"u seems like a noble gesture in the name of
individualism. However, this approach to takings is clearly misguided and
violates the separation of powers doctrine inherent in the Constitution. "
Case law construing the Fifth Amendment in the nineteenth century applied
a deferential due process standard to review land-use regulation,"8 not the
heightened scrutiny of the current Court's nexus requirement. In the nineteenth
century, as long as an exercise of the police power comported with due process,
the regulation passed constitutional muster."s The police power served as a
mechanism to govern the affairs of citizens toward each other. If in regulating
these affairs, the government adversely affected private property, property
owners had no recourse in compensation."S
Much of this broad police power concept derived from the concept of
sovereignty; a government had the power to govern its citizens and their
property. The police power inhered to the very existence of government.t " If
the government owed compensation for merely exercising its power to govern,
the whole idea of organized government would ring very hollow.' As
recognized by the Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois:
Rights of property that have been created by the common law cannot
be taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of
conduct, may be changed at the will, or even at the whim of the
185. Coming from an adherent of originalism, Justice Scalia's conscious ignorance of the
framers' intent seems suspicious. See generally Hon. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil,
57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989) (containing a general discussion of Justice Scalia's views on the
framers' intent).
186. The separation of powers doctrine is not expressly stated in the Constitution. Instead,
separation of powers is implied by the Vesting Clauses of Articles I, 11, and IM. See U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. 11, §1.
187. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Munnv. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
Even the later Legal Tender Cases, 179 U.S. 457, 551 (1890), held that indirect injury resulting
from police power regulations would not trigger the Takings Clause because only direct physical
appropriation could become a taking.
188. Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory "Takings": 7he Remarkable Resurrection of Economic
Substantive Due Process in Constitutional Law, 17 ENVTL. L. REv. 10369, 10371-72 (1987).
189. Munn, 94 U.S. at 113.
190. McGinley, supra note 188, at 10371.
191. Even Justice Holmes recognized this. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 413 (1922) ("Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law."). The only limits
Holmes envisioned for the police power were those dictated by the Due Process Clause. Id. See
also infra notes 201-17.
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legislature .... We know that this is a power which may be abused;
but that is no argument against its existence. For protection against
abuses by legislatures the people must reort to the polls, not the
courts. "9
2
Unambiguously, this statement conflicts with the very existence of the regulatory
takings doctrine, and weighs even stronger against strict scrutiny for regulatory
takings.
Until Pennsylvania Coal, Mugler v. Kansas' was regularly cited for the
proposition that the government need not compensate landowners for exercises
of the police power that adversely affected property value. 1' Regulating
property in the public interest did not entail any of the risks of arbitrary seizure
of private property from innocent landowners, and thus did not implicate the
Takings Clause. The power of legislatures to guard the public interest gave the
public no recourse to the courts when this power affected individual property
rights. Part of living under the American governmental system entailed
encumbrances on the use of public property'" for the common good.
Eventually, the Court found this view of the police power incompatible with
the development of the burgeoning American corporate economy.' 96 Instead
192. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1887).
193. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
194. In invalidating a state statute that prohibited the sale of liquor and enjoined the operation
of businesses manufacturing liquor, the Court held that
[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid
legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in
any just sense, be deemed an appropriation of property for the public benefit.... The
power which states have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will
be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not-and,
consistent with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be--burdened with
the condition that the state must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses
they may suffer ....
Id. at 668-69.
195. Some legal scholars argue that Mugler threatened to read the Takings Clause out of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Means, Motives, and Takings: The Nexus Test of
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 231 (1988). This claim
exaggerates Mugler. Mugler still recognized the Takings Clause for what it undoubtedly proposed
to do-prevent uncompensated physical appropriation by the government. The difference between
exercises of the police power and the taking of private property that Mugler recognized was the
difference between government as "prohibitor" and government as 'proprietor." Sax, supra note
11, at 39.
196. McGinley, supra note 188, at 10373 (1987). See also Sax, supra note 11, at 40 (noting
that as the scope of regulation grew, so did the perceived detrimental effects on previously
unrestrained productive use of property); Lawrence, supra note 195, at 235 (seeing Mugler as a
threat to economic development because landowners were not given sufficient consideration). See
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of creating a doctrine of regulatory takings to protect private property, the Court
abided by the Mugler due process approach to limiting the police power.,
However, the Court heightened the scrutiny under due process when applied to
police power regulations. This new due process scrutiny, intended to protect
businesses' proprietary interests, no longer deferred to the will of the
legislature. " With the veil of presumptive legislative validity for police
power regulations pierced, the Lochner period began."9 Lochner's failing was
the intense scrutiny applied by the Court to invalidate legislation under which
the public interest asserted by the legislature could not reach the level of
protection afforded to private economic rights.' ° The return to such scrutiny,
albeit in the form of regulatory takings analysis, suffers from the same problems
as economic due process analysis: Lochner by any other name-even Nollan or
Lucas-still smells as foul.
Even Justice Holmes, in formulating his "too far" test, 2" did not mean
to create the regulatory takings doctrine. Rather, Holmes intended to create a
deferential due process alternative to economic due process.'3 Well aware of
the dangers of economic due process,' Holmes was faced with a dilemma in
Pennsylvania Coal. While he believed in preserving the role of legislatures to
enact police power measures,' he also felt that on the facts before the Court,
generally Steven Siegal, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over
Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1984) (explaining the background of the
economic development that yielded the Lochner period); Robert A. Williams, Legal Discourse,
Social Vision and the Supreme Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the Lochnerian
Recurrence in First English Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59 U. CoLO. L. REv. 427 (1988)
(criticizing Lochner's social vision of property as a fundamental right).
197. Lawrence, supra note 195, at 234-35 (stating that vigorous economic due process replaced
more relaxed substantive due process).
198. See supra note 3 and cases cited therein.
199. McGinley, supra note 188, at 10373. The problem with Lochner rested not in the simple
fact that the Court employed due process analysis. Due process was, and still is, the proper measure
of the constitutional validity of land-use regulations. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study,
348 U.S. 59, 84 (1978) (Due Process Clause seeks to limit arbitrary government interference with
individual property interests, but reviewing courts should give great degree of deference to
legislation). See generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection against GovernmentAbuse of Power:
Has the Court Taken the Substance out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. Rev. 313
(1991) for a thoughtful examination of current standards under, and a call for the reemergence of,
the Due Process Clause.
200. See supra note 3.
201. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See also supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
202. Cotton C. Harness, M, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Its Historic Context and
Shifting Constitutional Principles, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 5, 12 (1992).
203. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
204. McGinley, supra note 188, at 10375.
Freitag: Takings 1992: Scalia's Jurisprudence and a Fifth Amendment Doctri
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994
776 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
the state legislature had overstepped its bounds.' To avoid the hypocrisy of
criticizing Lochner, but nonetheless using due process analysis to invalidate a
state law, Holmes phrased the law's invalidation in terms of a "taking. '"
But this reference to a taking did not invoke the Takings Clause. Holmes meant
that if a regulation went "too far" it would resemble a taking, but would in
reality be a violation of the Due Process Clause, not an exercise of the eminent
domain power. '
This nearly universal misreading of Pennsylvania Coal fails to recognize
that Holmes used the term "taking" in a metaphorical, not a Fifth Amendment,
sense.2 Legal scholars generally read Pennsylvania Coal to propose that the
police power and the eminent domain power differ only in degree.' Scholars
appear to understand Pennsylvania Coal to hold that when an exercise of the
police power goes "too far," a compensable taking occurs because the due
process violation melds into a taking claim, triggering the just compensation
requirement.
210
205. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
206. Id. at 415.
207. See McGinley, supra note 188, at 10374. See also Charles Siemon, Of Regulatory
Takings and Other Myths, 1 1. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 105, 110 (1985); Jeffrey T. Haley, Note,
Balancing Private Loss against Public Gain to Test for a Violation of Due Process or a Taking
without Just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REv. 315,329 (1979). Contra generally, Frank J. Strong,
On Placing Property Due Process Center Stage in Takings Jurisprudence, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 591
(1988). Professor Strong posits that Justice Holmes intended to invoke the Takings Clause, and to
use the Due Process Clause as a gauge to determine when the government owed compensation, i.e.,
taking without due process of law. This characterization confuses the two distinct clauses. The
Takings Clause serves to compel government payment for exercises of the eminent domain power,
while the Due Process Clause, in its substantive element, serves to circumscribe government power
by preventing arbitrary government interference generally with fundamental rights, and specifically
with property rights.
208. Charles L. Siemon and Wendy L. Larsen, The Taking Issue Trilogy: The Beginning of
the End?, 33 J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 169, 199 (1988). The New York Court of Appeals cogently
expressed this view in Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976).
In finding that no taking had occurred under a municipal zoning ordinance, the court stated:
True, many cases have equated an invalid exercise of the regulating... power,
perhaps only metaphorically, with a "taking" or a "confiscation" of property,
terminology appropriate to the eminent domain power and the concomitant right to
compensation when it is exercised....
The metaphor should not be confused with the reality. Close examination of the
cases reveals that in none of them, any more than in the Pennsylvania Coal case. .. ,
was there an actual 'taking" under the eminent domain power, despite the use of the
terms =taking" or "confiscatory." Instead, in each the gravamen of the constitutional
challenge to the regulatory measure was that it was an invalid exercise of the police
power under the due process clause ....
Id. at 385.
209. Siemon, supra note 207, at 111.
210. See, e.g., Strong, supra note 207.
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Justice Holmes did not intend this understanding to proliferate.2"
Instead, he simply meant that when police power regulations went "too far" and
deprived landowners of their property's value, the Due Process Clause was
violated. 2 An overly intrusive regulation would make the burden of the
regulation on the landowner unfair, and therefore, the legislature could only
maintain the legislation by paying the landowner for this unfairness.2 1
Tellingly, while engaged in his due process qua takings inquiry, Holmes did not
engage in the searching scrutiny his brethren employed under economic due
process. Holmes used rational scrutiny to invalidate the Kohler Act in
Pennsylvania Coal."1 4
For such universally cited precedent in the regulatory takings arena,
Pennsylvania Coal has been misinterpreted by the Court and legal scholars alike.
Upon closer scrutiny of Justice Holmes's message, Justice Scalia's takings
jurisprudence, developed in Nollant?" and Lucas, 6 looks precisely like the
Lochnerian analysis of land-use regulations that Justice Holmes had tried to
avoid.217
B. The Lessons of Theory: A New Approach to Regulatory Takings from
Old Judicial Concepts
The central issue in the debate over the propriety of the current Court's
regulatory takings doctrine is nothing less than the role of property in the
American constitutional system.218 Professor Carol M. Rose characterizes this
debate as the fundamental conflict between the two divergent property theories
211. Siemon & Larsen, supra note 208, at 199.
212. MeGinley, supra note 188, at 10375.
213. Sax, supra note 11, at 141. The due process violation could be remedied by paying
landowners for what they had been deprived under the regulation. McGinley, supra note 188, at
10375. This payment, to avoid confusion with payments made by the government under the Takings
Clause, should be characterized as payment for a due process violation-almost a legislative fine paid
to the landowner to revalidate the regulation.
214. Though Holmes never expressly refers to a review standard, some of his language, as well
as the general tenor of the Pennsylvania Coal opinion, indicate that Holmes did not require a strict
means/end nexus between the Kohler Act and the subsistence problem. See Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412, 416 (1922).
215. See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 118-65 and accompanying text.
217. See McGinley, supra note 188, at 10375: "Given Holmes' serious and deeply rooted
objections to the Court's open-ended use of substantive due process to attack police power
regulations, it is apparent that the Justice was articulating what he believed to be a viable alternative
to Lochnerian analysis. ... " Id.
218. See generally Humbach, supra note 163, at 21.
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that have contributed to American law,219 the battle between individual rights
in property and civic responsibility through property.' The individual rights
theory considers private property as the definition, and acquisition of property
as evidence, of individual freedom." As such, individual-rights-in-property
advocates would likely find government regulation of property as unwarranted
and even disturbing. If individuals are identified by their property, then
regulation of property is regulation of individuals. Government, by prescribing
the uses to which private property may be put, essentially defines individuals
lives, or at least circumscribes individual rights so severely as to make life little
more than what the government dictates.
Further, individual rights adherents would decry the differentiation of
personal and proprietary rights' under the Constitution, as construed by the
Court.' Therefore, they would conclude that personal and property rights
should be afforded at least similar constitutional protections through heightened
judicial review standards in the Supreme Court. If strict scrutiny guards against
infringements upon personal liberties, property regulations should be afforded
similar judicial attention.
By setting property on a pedestal free from governmental regulation, the
individual rights ideology can be characterized as anti-redistributive. The
government should rarely address problems of the property-less, and of the
public in general. When absolutely necessary to face these problems, the
government should employ revenue legislation, under which the members of the
219. See generally Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. Rsv. 561 (1984).
220. The discussion here uses Rose's article as merely a springboard. Though Rose would
characterize the conflict as between the Benthamite and the Aristotelian property traditions, between
virtue and wealth, see Rose, supra note 219, at 587-88, this note will label the conflict as between
the role of government in private property as envisaged by two schools of thought prevalent in the
early years of the American Constitution: Liberalism-rights in property exist prior to the
establishment of the sovereign power and individuals have the right to dispense with their property
to advance their own self-interests, and Republicanism-rights in property are held of the sovereign's
will by individuals for the benefit of the polity. See generally, Motion J. Horwitz, Republicanism
and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57 (1987). These
stereotypes as described are exaggerated. Most Americans would accept some ideas from both
extremes. The discussion of these stereotypes and their application to the Takings Clause is
speculative and serves only pedagogical purposes.
221. See Karlin, supra note 24, at 637; Levitt, supra note 13, at 199 (stating that property
defines the individual's sphere of sovereignty). See also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733, 737 (1964)
222. For example, an individual rights supporter might conclude that the right to privacy is
relatively worthless without property in which to enjoy this right.
223. This differentiationis generally attributed to United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S.
144 (1938). See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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polity shoulder the burden relatively equally.22' Individuals should be secure
in their property ownership. After all, individuals have individually acquired
their property; fairness only dictates that any deprivation of the bounties of the
individual effort should be roughly equal among individuals. Simply put, under
the individual rights theory, seeing property go to the "taxman," along with the
property of everyone else, does not raise the same concerns as seeing property
go to the "Congressman" through a regulatory taking in debatably less equitable
circumstances.
The individual rights ideology forms the central tenet of Lochner's assault
on government regulation:' Individuals, or corporations, should not be
forced to single-handedly bear the costs imposed by overly ambitious
legislatures. This discussion of individual rights should start to sound familiar,
or at least applicable, to the current Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence.
What Justice Scalia is attempting to do with the Takings Clause is exactly what
his predecessors on the Lochner Court were trying to do with the Due Process
Clause. Initially, this approach is appealing, familiar, and perhaps strongly
supported by the constitutional doctrine that American government is limited
government. 226
224. Alfred P. Levitt, Comment, Taking on a New Approach: The Rehnquist-Scalia Approach
to Regulatory Takings, 66 TEMP. L.Q. 197, 200 n.5 (1993).
By contrast, the function of the eminent domain power-government seizure of private
property for public use-has a distinctly redistributive quality to it. Government acquires, after
compensation, private property for the use of both rich and poor. But the benefits of such
acquisition flow proportionately greater to the poor who could not afford to buy the condemned
property themselves. Additionally, the compensationpaid for the property comes from government-
imposed revenue measures, the burden of which is borne most heavily by the rich. Treanor, supra
note 171, at 711 (citing Madison biographer Irving Brant). Yet, although government "adjust[s] the
benefits and burdens of economic life," Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978), through eminent domain, fairness also dictates that compensation should be paid to those
who directly transfer property to the government for public use. See Michelman, supra note 21,
at 1184 ("The one incontestable case for compensation. . . seems to occur when the government
deliberately brings it about that its agents, or the public at large, 'regularly' use, or 'permanently'
occupy, space ... understood to be under private ownership."); see also supra notes 53-66. Even
the rich as a class is still comprised of individuals, with individual rights-namely, title-in private
property that had been lost to the government, and thus deserve compensation.
225. Though the underlying issue in Lochner and its progeny was the ability of corporate
interests to maintain wealth in the face of government labor regulation, wealth translates here to
property rights.
226. See also Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SUP. CT. REv.
1, 2-3 (stating that the Takings Clause constrains government in a system of limited powers). This
assertion is particularly true of the federal government. The Court has held that federal legislation
must be based upon specific powers granted to Congress in the Constitution. See McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Cf U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or the people." A similar limitation on state power, though admittedly not as explicit
due to the fact that state government has broader regulatory powers under the police power, appears
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The alternative theory that has contributed to American property law is that
of civic responsibility through property. Civic responsibility advocates do not
equate individuals with their property; rather, individuals equate with their
government. As contributors to government, individuals have a duty and an
interest in promoting the government's function of providing for the public
weal. 7 Under this theory, an individual contributes property for the welfare
of others; in exchange for this sacrifice, individuals receive the largesse of the
government to which they contributed.m
Additionally, as contributors to government, individuals can dictate, through
their surrogates inside government, what really promotes the public interest and
what interests the government should pursue.' To civic-responsibility-
through-property advocates, the will of the majority through the legislature is
paramount in determining whether a regulation is acceptable; if the regulation
is rational, burdened landowners should resort to the legislature, not the courts,
for change. The civic responsibility theory would find deference to the will of
the polity proper for courts reviewing the constitutionality of legislative
enactments because the common good is determined by majority will.' This
discussion should also sound familiar; the American government is partially
founded upon such an ideology-the separation of powers.
When such historically respected political doctrines as limited government
and separation of powers conflict, as a rhetorical matter, can a "winner" be
declared? At first glance, this would seem impossible; after all, a qualified
referee in constitutional calculus does not exist. Also, the framers of the
Constitution obviously thought no reconciliation was necessary because both
theories of individual rights in property and civic responsibility through
property-of wealth and virtue-are found in the American governmental
system. More importantly, both theories have instructively shaped American
property law and takings jurisprudence. 2 '
in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See supra note 8.
227. Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modem Dialectic of Property, 9 CONST.
COMMENTARY 256, 261 (1992) (stating that fulfilling duty to community helps individuals realize
full benefits from property).
228. See, e.g., Note, Taking Back Takings: A Coasean Approach to Regulation, 106 HARV.
L. REv. 914 (1993) (stating that property rights of individuals should be tempered with a
communitarian vision).
229. This view comports with the original understanding of the Takings Clause. Property was
assumed to be subject to the implied obligation to benefit the community. Harness, supra note 202,
at 8; Treanor, supra note 171, at 699.
230. Harness, supra note 202, at 10.
231. Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 444 U.S. 85, 104 (1978) (civic
responsibility theory behind landmark preservation law) with Lucas v. California Coastal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (individual rights theory defeats development ban).
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However, on a fundamental level, the underlying conflict between these two
theories must be resolved with constitutional rights at stake. The test applied in
regulatory takings cases requires reformulation if the Court is to faithfully apply
the correct law and give the underlying constitutional principles of both
individual rights and civic responsibility, and their concomitant liberties, lasting
power. A takings doctrine that in alternate cases supports one or the other of
these theories would distress both camps: a profound victory in one case would
mean little, if the next decision could yield an equally profound loss. The
current Court has been leaning increasingly toward the individual rights
model, 2 but this shift alone does not bear the imprimatur of constitutional
validity if it advances individual rights to the neglect of civic responsibility.
The civic responsibility model occupies the higher constitutional ground.
The balance struck between individual rights and civic responsibility by the
framers of the Takings Clause weighs in favor of civic responsibility.33 The
framers intended individuals to receive compensation only for physical invasions
of private property by the government, not for regulatory limitations of private
property's use.' Individuals expected that the state would occasionally
burden their property by regulation; these burdens were intended to be the cost
of organized government to all individuals under the Constitution.
235
Questioning the viability and correctness of seventy years of Supreme Court
precedent in regulatory takings is serious business, but questioning its very
existence is quite another matter. 6  Though the regulatory takings doctrine
may rely on a misinterpretation of precedent, 7 the plethora of cases decided
232. This implication arises from the Nollan and Lucas decisions. See supra notes 84-104 for
a discussion of Nollan and supra notes 118-65 for a discussion of Lucas.
233. See supra notes 171-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the framers' intent. See
also Treanor, supra note 171, at 699.
234. See supra notes 171-86 and accompanying text.
235. Structurally, the civic duty model allows the governmentto regulate property to make the
polity normatively better by instilling duty and virtue owed to the state in the minds of citizens, but
still gives the Court power to enforce fundamental rights in property when they are denied
arbitrarily. This approach helps avoid the necessarily consequent injuries done to property and
perhaps the economy generally by many individuals simultaneously exercising their rights. See
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding ceiling on milk prices to prevent individual
producers from flooding the market at lower prices). Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(holding that Commerce Clause allows regulation of individual agriculture producer when Congress
attempts to control aggregate demand for product).
236. See supra notes 201-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pennsylvania Coal.
If this reading of Pennsylvania Coal is correct, the regulatory takings doctrine should not exist to
the extent that Holmes's decision of the Court is considered controlling precedent.
237. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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under it need not be discarded in toto. Rather, the application of this
doctrine by the current Court should be reevaluated.
The Supreme Court should modify its takings test so that only permanent
physical invasions sanctioned by the government are compensable under the
Takings Clause, and that regulatory takings are analyzed under the minimum
rationality standard of the Due Process Clause. In other words, takings clause
jurisprudence should be denuded of all but the Loretto per se rule.?29
The incursion of Lochner into the current Court's takings doctrine in Nollan
and Lucas suggests policy justifications for this new rule. This new rule would
provide much-needed certainty in such a convoluted area of constitutional law.
A constitutional law doctrine like takings, in which the Court has no viable
standards and issues decisions only after case-by-case inquiry,2' cannot
effectively safeguard constitutional rights, nor will it provide sufficient notice to
legislatures of which regulations will pass constitutional muster.
A related policy justification lies in the fact that this new rule will afford
legislatures flexibility to fashion regulations that meet society's new
problems." l  Without this flexibility, legislatures may refrain from
238. The assertion that the regulatory takings doctrine should not exist does not mean that the
Court would necessarily have to discard all cases already decided under the regulatory takings
doctrine. If a regulatory taking was not found in any given case, in all likelihood the regulation at
issue would also not offend the Due Process Clause. Only in cases where the Court had found a
taking would the proposed due process analysis demand a reexamination of result. Correctly
decided, but incorrectly reasoned cases would stand, while incorrectly decided, and incorrectly
reasoned, cases would become disfavored. This approach of overhauling a doctrine very dear to the
Court, while not overhauling all cases decided under that doctrine, is exactly the approach advocated
by Justice Scalia in the dormant commerce clause context. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midweseo
Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the Court should abandon its
current approach and leave essentially legislative decisions to the legislature, adopting a future
analysis more appropriate to the Court's role).
239. See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text. The rule proposed here would have
substantially the same effect as those proposed in Sax, supra note 11; Stoebuck, supra note 11.
Unlike those rules, the rule proposed in this note has the advantage of clarity in the due process
clause doctrine that would not allow extensive tampering by the Court.
240. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
241. Marshall Currey Cook, Note, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Low 7de for the
Takings Clause, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1433, 1441 (1993). See also Barry I. Pershkow & Robert F.
Housman, In the Wake of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Critical Look at Six
Questions Practitioners Should Be Asking, 23 ENVrL. L. REP. 10008, 10009 (1993) (concludingthat
the Court's new addition to the regulatory takings doctrine significantly diminishes legislative
discretion to regulate injurious activities).
Such flexibility is particularly necessary in light of the remedy of compensation currently
imposed on all takings clause violations. After First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, California, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), the government owes compensation for even
temporary takings. For instance, during the pendency of litigation of a successful takings challenge,
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promulgating valuable land-use regulations-especially in the urban planning and
environmental protection contexts-for fear of unduly straining already strained
public coffers if a takings challenge succeeds. Finally, this new rule will avoid
Justice Scalia's flirtation with, and precedential proliferation of, the principles
behind Lochnerian scrutiny of land use regulation. Land use regulation
comports with a long tradition of burdening private property. With the new
challenges facing federal, state, and local governments, and the property under
their domain, majority rule and presumptive legislative validity under the Due
Process Clause is more realistic than judicial superlegislation. 2
V. CONCLUSION
"[T]he great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common
law."" Land use regulation offers government an effective method for
addressing problems not contemplated at common law. By examining land use
regulations under heightened scrutiny and limiting the scope of these regulations
to restrictions contemplated at common law, the Court has returned to the
excesses of the Lochner period under the guise of the regulatory takings
doctrine. The United States Supreme Court should drastically alter its Fifth
Amendment analysis of land-use regulations to provide that compensation under
the Takings Clause is due only for permanent physical occupation authorized by
the government. '  What are currently termed regulatory takings challenges
should be analyzed under the deference afforded to property restrictions under
the Due Process Clause. This rule would vindicate once again majority rule and
end once again the spread of Lochner by Justice Scalia's takings jurisprudence.
J. Freitag*
the government may owe the landowner money for the period during which the landowner was
burdened by the regulation, even if the government retracts the invalid regulation. Under a due
process analysis, subsequent repeal by the government serves as a sufficient remedy if the regulation
is found unconstitutional.
242. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
243. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
244. This term the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on a regulatory takings case.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), cen. granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov.
30, 1993). A decision is expected before the Court's summer recess.
* The author wishes to thank the following scholars for their constructive criticism that helped
to pave the way to publication: Professor Laura Gaston Dooley, Professor Rosalie Berger Levinson,
and Professor David A. Myers.
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